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Summary  findings
International river and lake basins constitute about 47  Their objective: to understand when, where, and how
percent of the world's contiienital land area, a  much the economic interests of the states conflict, to
proportion  that increases to about 60 percent in Africa,  develop principles guaranteeing efficient allocations of
Asia, and South America. Because water is a scarce and  scarce water supplies, and to identify when stable (self-
increasingly valuable resource, disputes about water  enforcing) allocation agreements are possible. They also
allocation within these basins often contribute to  consider the possibility of using alternative sources of
regional tensions and conflicts.  supply and of accommodating growth  in demand.
Many principles of international law have been  Satellite technology will soon dramatically improve the
developed to allocate water within a water basin and to  ability of riparian states to predict annual flow volumes.
prevenlt  or resolve international water disputes.  In addition, water basin authorities will have real-time
Unfortunately. they rarely are easy to apply and often are  data on riparians' water use. These developments will
contradictory. Sharing river water is particularly difficult  have important implications for the enforceability and
because the effects are one-way, with upstream-  the flexibility of river water allocation systems.
downstream supply disputes have been among the most  This model shows how flexibility can be used to
common. Agreements about the allocation of river water  construct more durable systems for sharing water among
often last only until the first drought, when reduced flow  riparian states. The new allocation methods proposed
denies some their full shares.  here should contribute to the better management of
Kilgour and Dinar develop a simple formal model of  scarce water supplies, a crucial issue in an increasingly
water allocation among states within a river basin. They  thirsty world.
analyze the model in the context  of variable flow rates,
to project the behavior of r  iparian states during periods
of above-normal and below-normal flow.
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1. Introduction
Many of the world's river and lake basins  and ground water aquifers  are shared by two
or more  countries. In a United  Nations  study, international  river and lake basins  were estimated
to comprise about 47 percent of the world's continental  land area (United Nations, 1978).  In
Africa,  Asia, and South  America,  this proportion  rises to at least 60 percent (Barrett, 1994). Of
the 200 international  rivers in a survey  cited by Barrett  (1994), 148  are shared by two countries,
30 by three, 9 by four, and 13 by five or more countries--as  many as ten.
Most countries  that share ownership  of water resources  also depend  on those resources.
Thus, the size of a country's share of a commonly-held  water body has important direct and
indirect  effects on the country's well-being. If the common  waters are rivers, these direct and
indirect  effects are unidirectional,  and can create problems  are particularly  difficult  to resolve.
The direct  effects  of water  allocation  in international  river basins  are crucial because water
is an essential  input for many productive  processes,  and alternative  sources  may be impractical.
But  neither  is it possible  to ignore the indirect  outcomes  (externality  effects) of water allocation.
These  considerations  may  include  not only reduction  of water level and flow volume (because  of
excessive  withdrawals  upstream), but also deterioration  of water quality (as a result of pollution
in return flows upstream).  It is hardly surprising  that international  rivers have often been the
focus of regional  tensions  and conflicts.
Examples  of upstream-downstream  disputes  (Vlachos, 1990;  Barrett, 1994;  Kirmany and
Rangeley,  1994) include  the proposal for out-of-basin  diversion  of the Mekong River (Thailand
and Laos);  the operation  of the Farraka Barrage diversion  of the Ganges  (India and Bangladesh);
the proposed  desalination  plant near Morales  Dam on the Colorado  River (Mexico  and U.S.A.);
and the recent dispute  over the 1959 Nile water agreement  (Egypt, Sudan, and now Ethiopia).
In the literature  on international  water disputes,  several principles  have been proposed  to
prevent or resolve disputes  within an international  water basin (Sofer 1992):
*  The Harmon Doctrine, that a state has absolute  sovereignty  over the area of the river basin
within it.  This principle clearly favors upstream  states.
*  The principle  of Territorial Integration of all Basin States.  Symmetrically,  this principle
favors  downstream  states,  to which  it accords  "equal"  use, without  regard to their contribution
to the flow.page 2
*  Equitable Utilization of River Water. According to this principle, each riparian state can use
the river water unless this use negatively affects other riparians.
*  The Mutual  Use Principle, that a riparian state may object to another riparian state's use of
river water, unless it receives reasonable direct compensation.
*  The Linkage Principle, that, as a condition for agreeing to a particular water allocation, a state
may request compensation in a non-related area (such as a special trade agreement).
These  principles  all  refer to  appealing notions of  fairness  and  rights;  regretably,  however,
contradictions and inconsistencies seem to be inevitable when they are put into practice.
There  is no international law governing the allocation of waters in international rivers.
Nonetheless, the 1966 Helsinki Document (Henkin et al.  1987) provides a list of considerations
to be included in the determination of a riparian state's water allocation.  These include:
- Geography - the state's  land area;
*  Hydrology - the state's relative water contribution;
*  Climate;
*  History - the past and present use of water;
- Economic and Social needs of the state;
*  Cost of obtaining water from alternative sources;
*  Availability of other resources;
*  Efficiency of water use;
*  Capability of compensating other states;
*  Pareto Optimality.
(The last point is that no allocation should be considered unless it is Pareto-efficient, which means
that any alternative allocation that increases the welfare of any individual state must reduce the
welfare of at least one other state.)
Yet even the apparently straightforward ideas of the Helsinki Document can be difficult
to apply.  One reason is that most of them are not constant over time--they change with flow in
the river basin, and with national and international events and trends.
Although  conditions  in  a  river  basin,  and  in  the  riparian  countries,  are  usually
characterized  by  constant  change,  traditional  water  allocation  schemes  make  no  effort  to
accomodate changes. The literature (Food and Agricultural Organization 1978, 1984) lists 3707
international water utilization agreements, virtually all of which exhibit this inflexibility.
Sometimes, renegotiation of in-force river-water allocation agreements takes place.  For
instance, the Nile River is shared by nine countries (Ethiopia, Zaire,  Tanzania, Burundi, Uganda,
Rwanda,  Kenya,  Sudan,  and  Egypt),  but only  Egypt and  Sudan were  Nile water  recipients
according to the 1929 water-sharing agreement.  Egypt was to receive 48 Million Cubic Meterspage 3
(MCM) per year, and Sudan just 4 MCM.  Thirty years later, renegotiation produced the 1959
Nile Treaty, in which Egypt was allocated 55.5 MCM per year, and Sudan 18.3 MCM.  In turn,
this agreement has recently been challenged  by other riparian countries, who are interested in their
own shares of Nile water (Whittington et al.,  1994).
But political  instability over water supplies, including possibly war,  is always possible.
Renegotiation  of water-sharing agreements typically takes place in a tense atmosphere,  sometimes
exacerbated  by threats and hostile actions.  Two of the river  basins in which  riparians have
recently objected to current water allocations--the Nile (Whittington et al.,  1994) and the Jordan
(Wolf, 1992)--lie in a politically volatile region--the Middle East.
Another aspect of water-sharing agreements that can lead to acrimony is enforcement.  A
state may have agreed to limit itself to a certain fixed volume of river water, but who or what is
to stop it from increasing its consumption? Such unilateral violations of an agreement could take
place openly or clandestinely.  In fact, actual violations may be less damaging than the fear that
other states are secretly engaging in routine violations.
In general, enforcement--comprising  activities and structures designed to prevent or deter
individual  decisionmakers from acting in their immediate interests rather than complying with a
specific regime--can  be  difficult and expensive.  This  is particularly  true  for environmental
enforcement  in an international context, where the prerequisites  for domestic success, reliable
information about behavior and credible threats of sanctions or penalties, are especially difficult
to attain (Kilgour et al.,  1992; Kilgour,  1994).
Fortunately,  new technology will soon alleviate information problems for international
agreements about the sharing of river water.  Data on water levels gathered by satellite will be
made available publically, permitting flow volumes and withdrawal rates to be calculated. (SADC,
WB, and WMO,  1993)  In addition, much more accurate forecasts of annual flow volumes will
become available to all riparians.
Considerable political stability may be achieved simply through this sharp increase in the
volume and  accuracy of flow information.  One likely consequence is much simpler and more
effective enforcement.  Furthermore,  the availability of accurate one-year forecasts will play a
fundamental  role,  permitting  questions  related  to  the  stochastic  nature  of  the  flow  to  be
sidestepped.  There  is no need to ensure  that allocations are  "on average"  fair or  welfare-
maximizing if they can be modified annually so that they possess these properties every year.
Annual adjustment  of allocations is certainly a new and promising idea.  Studies by the UN
Food and Agriculture Organization (1978, 1984) indicate that most water allocation agreements
include static descriptions of both the supply of and the demand for water.  For example, the 1959
Nile Agreement,  predicated on the construction of the Aswan Dam, explicitly incorporates the
assumption that  "there  will be an  annual mean flow at Aswan of 84  MCM."  Losses were
estimated at 10 MCM, and the entire balance was confidently allocated to Egypt and Sudan with
little or no explicit provision for years of below-normal flow.page  4
The annual volume of river water may conceivably be constant in a few cases, but usually
it is stochastic. River flow is well known to be affected by weather, for example, and fluctuations
of  25%  above  or  below the mean annual  flow volume are  quite common.  As well,  some
authorities  have predicted that climatic changes and long-term drought events will alter  mean
annual flow by up to 70% in some rivers (ILRI, 1993). Equally, the demand for river water may
change over time.  Dynamic demand patterns may reflect population growth, changes in national
priorities,  long-term planning, adoption of new technologies, and changes in tastes.
A water-sharing  scheme that accounts for the stochastic nature of water supply and the
dynamic  nature  of  water  demand  will  almost  certainly  produce  more  political  stability.
Destabilizing  shortages  are already  a  risk  in river  basins where  average  water consumption
approaches average flow volume.  In addition to reducing political tensions, the ability to match
allocations to current conditions may reduce regional water-allocation transactions costs, allow
states to plan water-related investments more effectively, and increase regional social welfare.
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is to  characterize  stable water-sharing  agreements  in  the
presence of accurate foreknowledge  of annual supply, identify allocations that are Pareto-efficient,
and show how flexible rather than fixed allocation schemes reduce costs.  Section 2 discusses the
definitions and assumptions on which the water-allocation models are based. Section 3 provides
a rather general analysis, and some examples, of how two-state water-allocation agreements can
be structured optimally.  Section 4 illustrates how the method could be applied to certain three-
state problems, and Section 5 provides a summary evaluation of the effects of stochastic flow on
the allocation structures proposed here.  Some conclusions are gathered in Section 6.
2. Modeling Definitions and Assumptions
The models used below to analyze water sharing among states in a river basin treat states'
internal  economies  and  their  external  economic  relations  as  independent.  Internal  models
represent states' individual needs for water as well as alternative (out-of-basin) sources of water
supply, if any; each state must have its own internal model.  In contrast, only one external model
covers  all states--it is geographic and not economic, and represents the relevant aspects of the
river basin, i.e.  the relative positions of the states with respect to river flow.
2.1 Individual State Models
A model of an individual state describes the state's internal need for river water.  It also
describes the state's opportunities (if any) to obtain water from sources external to the river basin.
State i's water demand function characterizes its need for water by showing the amount
of water that would be purchased within the state, denoted qi, as a function of the (internal) unit
price of water, pi.  As usual, the demand function for state i is given in the formpage  5
P  =  f(q 1 )
For technical reasons, this report will concentrate on  P  Demand  Curves
demand functions of the exponential form,
p  - ae
Two demand curves of this form are shown in the
diagram at the right.  The parameter a  >  0 equals  q
the value of p  at q = 0, and the parameter b  > 0
measures the rate of decrease of p as q increases.
Of the  two curves  at the  right,  the one  with  the
larger  value  of a  also  has the larger  value of b.
Water-sharing  problems involving two states with
demand functions similar to these are analysed in section 3.
A state may also have the option of purchasing water from an outside source,  i.e. water
that does not originate in the river basin.  In some models discussed below, a given state may be
able  to  purchase  water  at  a  fixed  price  per  unit,  in  any  amount  up  to  a  fixed  ceiling.
Generalizations to variable price purchases are possible, but have not been attempted at this stage.
The general objective of the water-sharing schemes designed below is to determine ways
to share water that maximize welfare insofar as possible.  Only two commodities are included--
water and money.  A state's total welfare is considered to equal its consumers'  surplus, calculated
according to its water demand function, plus its net money receipts with respect to water.  Thus,
if state i benefits from total water consumption qi, its total welfare is
WELFAREi  CONSUMPTION  SURPLUS,  +  NET  TRANSFERS1
ffi(q)  dq  +  Xi
0
where  Xi, the net transfer to state i, equals the net receipts from other within-basin states for the
sale or purchase of river water, reduced by the total of any payments for out-of-basin water.
The exponential form of the demand functions given above has certain implications for a
state's  internal water economy.
(1) States have no absolute minimum water requirements, i.e. there is no demand level q,  >  0
below which price becomes infinite; and
(2) No state's demand is ever saturated, i.e. in the absence of other arrangements,  all availablepage 6
water will be purchased and consumed internally, although the purchase price may be very low.
The second feature may not be a practical restriction in view of recent experience in many river
basins where  water demand consistently exceeds flow.  The first feature would not normally
hinder the model's ability to represent the situation of source states (see section 2.2),  which may
simply withdraw as much water as they need.  For non-source states, this assumption is innocuous
if internally-sourced  water, which is not included in the flow model of section 2.2,  is adequate
to meet any such absolute requirements. (Internally-sourced water is within-basin water available
to the state in question but not received from any upstream state.  If not consumed internally,  it
would be added to total river flow.)  Another way to interpret the model is to measure only those
flow volumes in excess of the minimum necessary to support the river ecology.  Taking this
approach means that these models can never imply the loss of ecological communities; at the same
time, however, it renders the models incapable  of dealing with flows that are so low as to threaten
such losses.
2.2 Flow Model
The  flow  model  represents  the  geography  of  water  flow  within  the  river  basin.
Essentially, the flow model identifies  the states involved, and specifies the water-flow relationship
of each to the others.  In the simplified  models used here, all states  are either source states or non-
source states.
A source  state is a state from which water flow originates; a non-source state is a state
which  receives  its water from one or more other states.  In the models used here, each source
state passes water to exactly one non-source state; each non-source state receives water from one
or more states (which may be source or non-source states).  Thus,  in the Graph Theory sense,
a source state has no predecessors and one successor, and a  non-source state has at least one
predecessor.  It will also be assumed that there are at least two states (otherwise there would be
no sharing  problem) and that there is exactly one non-source state with no successors; this is
called the outlet state.
Source states have a special advantage, in that they have the first opportunity to withdraw
water from the river system.  Indeed, for technical convenience, and to simplify the diagrams,
all of the technical calculations below are carried out according to the Harmon Doctrine--each
state owns all the water it receives--but, as noted in Section 3.2,  below, this assumption is not
essential by any agreed-upon status  quo water rights.
It is clear that the new capabilities for enforcement under discussion here are not helpful
in geographic situations in which a portion of the river itself constitutes an international boundary.
Assuming that this does not occur, there can be only one two-state flow model, represented in
the diagram on the left, below.  Several models incorporating this geography are presented and
analyzed in section 3.  Likewise, there are two three-state models, the I-geography (shown in the
middle  diagram below),  and Y-geography(shown at the right).  The  1-geography models thepage  7
Jordan River basin, and the Y-geography is a very rough model of the Nile. A simple three-state




DOWN  DOWN  DOWN
Two-State  Geography  Three-State I-Geography  Three-State  Y-Geography
3. Two-State  Models
Throughout this section there are two states, called UP and DOWN, which share a river
basin, as shown schematically by the diagram on the left, above.  Their demands for water are
given by
UP:  Pu  a  e  "qu
DOWN:  PD  aDe  DqD
The example to be analyzed in detail in
section  3.2  has  the  following  p  Demand Curves
parameters:  DOWN
Example 1:  au = 6.0,  bu = 0.5;  p
aD =  8.0,  bu  =  1.0
Example 1 demand curves are sketched  q
in the diagram on the right.page 8
3.1 Specification  of the Two-State  Problem
States UP and DOWN are to share the river water, which originates entirely within UP,
in  some optimal way.  Essentially, sharing takes place when UP does not consume the entire
volume,  instead passing some of it on to DOWN.  DOWN,  in turn,  compensates UP  with a
money  payment.  In accordance with  the general  objectives of this  research,  what  will  be
determined below is a schedule for sharing water, and making payments, that depends explicitly
on total flow volume.  Through sections 3.1 and 3.2, the problem is simplified by assuming no
out-of-basin sources.  This aspect will be included in section 3.3.
Let Q denote the total flow from UP to DOWN if there were no withdrawals by UP.  Then
UP's withdrawal amount, qu, must satisfy
0  <  qu  ￿  Q
and DOWN's withdrawal,  qD,  must satisfy
0  ￿  qD  '  Q-  qu
The  non-saturation  assumption  is relevant at this point.  First,  it implies  that DOWN  will
withdraw all available water, in other words that
qD  Q  -qu
But it also implies that, in the absence of other considerations, UP will do likewise.
Thus,  qu  <  Q only  if UP receives some compensation, which is modeled here as an
amount, x, transferred from DOWN to UP.  Such a transfer is feasible provided the values of Q
and qu are known to be public knowledge.  But notice that the amount transferred, x, is in fact
the total price to DOWN of the water volume Q - qu.  So what is required here are two functions,
q(Q) and x(Q),
such that, if total volume is Q, then the withdrawal by UP of qu = q(Q) units of water (leaving
Q - q(Q) units for DOWN), and the payment of x(Q) by DOWN to UP, maximizes welfare in
some sense.
In  fact,  the  problem  is  largely  solved  as  soon as  all  schedules of  withdrawals  and
payments,
(q(Q), x(Q))
that are efficient in the Pareto sense, have been identified. For any such schedule, it is guaranteedpage  9
that any other schedule that offers a higher level of welfare to one state must offer a lower level
of welfare to the other.
In accordance with the definitions above, the welfare of UP is given by
Wu(quq  x)  =  Sf(q)  dq  t  x  =  I[1  - e -'u4]  tX
ffu  b
0 
and the welfare of DOWN by
WD(qD,  x)  ffD(q)  dq  - x  =  - e  D  D]  X  X
0  ~~~~~~bD
For Example 1, these functions are
Wu(q,x)  12 [1  e -q12  +  X
WD(q,x)  8  [1  - e-(Q  )]  - x
In section 3.2,  the two-state problem will be solved in general, and for the specific case
of  Example  1.  Section 3.2  will also  introduce the closely related Example 2.  Example 3,
introduced in section 3.3,  is identical to Example 1 except that UP is allowed the opportunity to
purchase up to a fixed amount of water, at a fixed price, from an outside source.  In this case, the
function  Wu must be modified to reflect that any payments made by UP for out-of-basin water
reduce UP's  net proceeds, and therefore UP's  welfare.
3.2  The  Two-State  Problem  with No Out-of-Basin  Sources: Solution  and Examples
We now proceed to the identification  of optimal schedules, (q, x), for the fundamental two-
state problem  introduced above.  As noted in section 2.2,  we assume for convenience that the
source state, UP, "owns" the water, and therefore has the option of withdrawing the entire flow
volume, Q.  We also assume that, currently, there are no direct payments for water (from DOWN
to UP).  Thus we take (q, x)  =  (Q, 0) to be the Status Quo schedule.  Note that the technical
calculations are unchanged under different models of ownership of river water; as well, current
water-related payments could be included in the model by using a Status Quo schedule,  (q0, x0),
with 0 <  qo  <  Q  and  x 0 f  0.page 10
Our first objective is to identify all schedules that are at least as preferable for both states
as the Status Quo.  To do this, we will identify in turn all schedules (q, x) such that
W,Jq, .r) > WIXQ,  0), and then all schedules (q, x) such that WD(q,  x)  2  WD(Q,  0).  Any schedules
satisfying both these conditions must be at least equally preferred to the Status Quo by both states.
Note that this intersection must be non-empty, because it must contain the Status Quo schedule,
(Q, 0).
This  process  is represented  in Figure  1, which shows the Status Quo as an open circle
within  the (two-dimensional) space of all schedules.  The two thick lines emanating from  the
Status  Quo are the Basic Indifference Curves.  They represent all schedules indifferent to UP
(lower line) and indifferent to DOWN (upper line).  Figure 2 shows the Basic Indifference Curves
for Example 1, for the particular case Q =  1.
Figure 1 shows not only the Basic Indifference Curves,  but also other indifference curves
of both UP and DOWN.  These are obtained by shifting either of the Basic Curves directly up or
down.  A few of UP's  and DOWN's  indifference curves,  obtained in this way,  are shown in
Figure  I as thin curves parallel to the Basic Indifference Curves.
Note that UP always prefers higher indifference  curves, and DOWN always prefers  lower
curves.  This observation  implies that any schedules that both sides prefer to the Status Quo lie
above UP's  Basic Indifference Curves, and below DOWN's.  This is the situation illustrated in
Figure 1.  Figure 2 shows the Basic Indifference for Example 1 when Q =  1; clearly, such jointly
preferred  schedules do exist in this case.  If UP's  Basic Indifference Curve were to lie entirely
above DOWN's,  then there would be no jointly  preferable schedules--the  states could not do
better  than to accept the Status Quo--UP  gets all the water;  DOWN  gets no water,  but pays
nothing.  Example 2,  below, will be used to show that it is possible that there are no schedules
jointly  preferred  to the Status Quo.
Thus, the Status Quo, (Q, 0), is optimal when UP's  Basic Indifference Curve  lies entirely
above DOWN's.  But what if there are many schedules jointly  preferred  to the Status Quo, as
suggested by Figure  I?  In fact,  Figure  2 makes clear that there could be a jointly  preferred
schedule (q, x) for every q C [0, Q].  With such a profusion of schedules available, can some be
better than others?
The answer lies again in indifference curves.  Begin in Figure 1 at any schedule slightly
above and to the left of the Status Quo.  By moving upward and to the left, and staying between
the two indifference curves passing through the initial schedule, new schedules preferred  by both
sides  are obtained.  Shifting in this way to a jointly preferred  schedule is possible as long as
DOWN's  indifference curve is more steeply sloped than UP's.  Likewise,  any schedule lying
between  the two Basic Indifference Curves in Figure  1, with a very  small value of q,  can be
improved by moving downward and to the right, as long as UP's indifference curve at the starting
point is steeper than DOWN's.  Clearly any schedule between the two Basic Indifference Curves
can be jointly improved in this way, except those where the two states' indifference curves have
equal slopes.page 1  1
The equal slope condition defines the Contract Curve, which constitutes  the set of all
schedules  that are
(1)  preferred or indifferent, for both states, to the Status Quo; and
(2)  Pareto-efficient  within the set of schedules  jointly preferred to the Status Quo.
The latter property means that whenever  an initial schedule  lies above UP's Basic Indifference
Curve and below DOWN's, then another schedule  preferred by both states  exists if and only if
the initial  schedule  is not on the Contract  Curve. Thus the schedules  on the Contract Curve solve
the problem--they  are improvements  on the Status  Quo that cannot themselves  be improved  upon.
The idea  of a Contract  Curve goes  back  to Edgeworth,  and is related  as well to the von Neumann-
Morgenstern  Stable  Set.
Remarkably, in water-sharing  problems of this type, the Contract Curve is always a
vertical line segment, as shown in Figure 1.  Define  q0, xm,  and XM so that the points on the
Contract Curve constitute  the set
{(q,x)  :  q =  qo ,xm  <  X  <  x￿  }
Figure 1 shows  the locations  of q 0, xm, and  XM in general. Note that all three are functions  of Q.
It is in general  possible  to determine  specific  functional  forms for q 0, xm, and xM,  provided
the demand functions are given explicitly.  For instance, for two-state exponential demand
problems,
bD  au
Q  if  Q  I1n  auJ
<  U  ~otherwise
bU + bD
For Example 1,
2o  =  2  Q -n(  14
provided Q 2  ln(4/3)  0.288, and qo = 0 otherwise.page 12
The Contract Curve division of water volume for Example I is shown in Figure 3.  Note
that, for each value of Q, the arnount of water to be shared is represented by the 450 line.  Thus,
Figure 3 shows how the volume of water consumed by UP, and the volume received by DOWN,
depend  on the total flow, Q.  In this case, the division is represented by a straight line which
intersects the 450 line at Q =  ln(4/3), the threshold level at which UP's  optimal consumption
level, q 0, drops to zero.  Thus, if the total volume is below this threshold, all of the water is sold
by UP to DOWN.  If the volume is above this threshold, the amount sold equals a fixed amount,
ln(4/3), plus 2/3 of the balance.  This is implied by the formula above, and is illustrated by the
slope (1/3) of the division line in Figure 3.
The Contract  Curve implies not just  a water division, but a  "bargaining range"  for the
amount  transferred  from DOWN  to UP, [Xm,  -M].  The quantities  xm  and X.,  the endpoints  of the
Contract Curve shown in Figure 1, are of course functions of Q.  Figure 4 shows this bargaining
range  for  Example  1.  The  sharp changes in slope of both the minimum and the maximum
transfers occur at exactly Q = ln(4/3), the threshold value of Q below which UP consumes no
river water.  In general,  the bargaining range can be calculated explicitly provided the demand
functions are known.
At this stage, Example 2 can be mentioned briefly.  Example 2 is identical to Example 1
except that UP's and DOWN's  demand functions are reversed.  Thus
Example 2:  au = 8.0, bl, =  1.0; aD = 6.0,  bu = 0.5.
The  solution of Example 2 is straightforward,  and will not be described here.  However,  the
optimal water allocations to UP and DOWN, shown in Figure 5, do have an important property.
Note that, at low volumes (small values of Q), all of the water is allocated to UP.  In this interval,
the Status Quo schedule, (Q, 0), is in fact optimal--there are in fact no schedules jointly  preferred
or indifferent to it.  Thus, as noted earlier,  it is possible that there is no transfer of water from
UP to DOWN, and no payments from DOWN to UP.  In the case of Example 2,  it occurs when
total volumes are extremely low, because very small quantities of water are more valuable to UP
than DOWN.
3.3 The Two-State  Problem  with Out-of-Basin  Sources: Solution  of an Example
The extended two-state problem studied here, called Example 3, is identical to Example
1, analyzed in section 3.2,  except for one provision--the upstream state, UP, has the option of
purchasing  water from an out-of-basin source.  The amount of water that can be purchased is
limited and the (unit) purchase price is fixed.  Example 3 is thus identical to Example 1, except
that UP has the option to purchase up to 1 unit of water, at a cost of 2 per unit.
Before a schedule for sharing water and making compensating  transfers can be determined,
UP's  optimal  policy for purchasing water must be determined.  If UP purchases m units and
extracts q units from the river flow, UP's  total welfare ispage 13
Wu(q,m,x)  =  12[1  - e-(44'm)/2]  -2m  t  x
When  this  expression is  maximized with  respect to  m, UP's  optimal purchase policy is
determined,  as follows:
[  1  if  q  < In(3)  - 1
ms(q)  {In(3)  - q  if  In(3)  - 1  < q  < In(3)
t  0  if  q  2  In(3)
Thus, UP should  purchase as much external water  m*(q)
as possible,  subject  to a maximum  of ln(3)  - q units.  ,  UP's  Optimal  Purchase  Policy
It is easy to check that, when qu = ln(3),  Pu = 2.
UP's purchasing  policy is illustrated  at right.  X
Substitution  of m =  m*(q) into Wu(q, m, x)
yields a welfare function  for UP that depends  only  2
on q and x.  This welfare function,  q
Wu*(q, x)  = Wu(q,m*(q),x)
incorporates the assumption that UP chooses its
optimal purchase policy. When combined  with DOWN's welfare function in the usual way, it
produces  a schedule  that takes into account  UP's out-of-basin  purchase  option.
The resulting  schedule  is shown  as Figure 6.  Note the following  properties:
(1)  when total volume is very low, all river water is sold by UP to DOWN--in fact, the
threshold  volume  below  which UP consumes  no river water is much higher as a result of
UP's out-of-basin  purchase  option;
(2)  when total  flow is somewhat  greater, but still low, the base volume plus 1/3 of the excess
is sold to DOWN;
(3)  at a somewhat  higher  threshold,  DOWN's  volume  is fixed--it  does not increase  when total
volume increases;  and
(4)  when total volume is very large, UP again extracts  2/3 of the incremental  flow.
A comparison  of Figures 3 and 6 is instructive. Note that in both cases DOWN receives
all of the river water when the total volume  is extremely  low. But the threshold  level at which
UP starts to consume river water is considerably  higher in Figure 6.  In general, UP receives  apage 14
reduced allocation of river water in Example 3, except that when water volume is very high
(Q  2  ln(36)  3.584)  the allocation to UP is unchanged--i.e the divisions in Examples I and 3
coincide. Of course, when flow  volumes  are very high, UP's outside purchase option is not used
because the "internal" price of water is much lower than the fixed "external" (purchase)  price.
Comparison of the bargaining ranges with (Figure 7) and without (Figure 4) out-of-basin
purchase is also instructive. For very large volumes (Q 2  ln(36) again), the ranges are identical.
For extremely small volumes (Q < ln(4/3)  0.288), the upper boundary of the range is identical,
but the lower boundary moves down when the option is available.  This reflects that, because of
its option, the river water is not as valuable to UP.  Over most of the intervening values of total
flow, UP sells more of the river water to DOWN, and receives more for it--although the "unit
price" actually declines.  (Since the Contract Curve method determines a specific volume of water
to  be sold  by  UP  to DOWN,  but determines only a  range of payments, only an average  or
expected  unit price can be calculated.)  Nonetheless it is clear  that the out-of-basin purchase
option benefits both sides at all volumes up to the level at which there is so much river water that
the optimal schedule is the same in both examples.
This completes the analysis of the two-state problem.  It is important at this point to review
the properties  of the solution that have been identified.  Given the states' water demands, it is
possible to determine a schedule  which gives, for any level of total flow,  the optimal consumption
level for each state.  Furthermore, a bargaining range, specifying bounds on the amount of money
to be transferred  to balance this transaction, can also be determined.  Thus,  under this system
states can plan for a particular volume of water, and a particular level of transfers,  as soon as the
total annual flow can be accurately predicted.  The next section shows similar results for a three-
state problem.
4. Three-State  Models
As noted in section 2.2, there are two distinct three-state  geographies, the I-geography and
the  Y-geography.  In  the  following,  only  1-
geography  models  will  be  considered;  models
based on Y-geography will be addressed in future
work.
U  P
4.1 The Three-State  I-Geography  Problem  MI
with No Out-of-Basin  Sources  MID
In  this  section,  Example 4,  a  three-state  DOWN
generalization  of  Example  1.  The three  states,
called  UP,  MID,  and  DOWN,  are  assumed  to
exhibit 1-geography, as defined in section 2.2 and  Locations of UP, MID, and DOWNpage 15
illustrated by the sketch at the right.  River flow begins in the source state UP, and then passes
through MID to the outlet state DOWN.
The specific  water demands for two of the three states are identical to those of the two
states of Example 1.  Specifically, the water demands in Example 4 are
UP:  P  6 e  12
MID:  PM  8e
DOWN:  PD  N14  e  D
Thus, UP's  demand in Example 4 is the same as in Example 1, and MID's demand in Example
4 is identical to DOWN's in Example 1.  A further property shared with earlier examples is that
the further downstream a state, the greater its need for small amounts of water, and the less its
need for large amounts.  Thus DOWN in Example 4 is even more desirous of low volumes of
water than DOWN in Example 1.  As noted above, this feature tends to assure that, when total
volume is very low, all of the water is sold by upstream states to downstream states.
A  water-sharing  and  compensation schedule must  specify how much  water  is to  be
consumed, and how much compensation is to be received (or paid), by each state.  Since there
are three states in this problem, a schedule is a 6-tuple
(qu,  qm,  qD;  XUI  XM9  XD)
satisfying
qu  2  °,  qM  2 °,  qD2  0
qu + q  +  qDQ
and
XU=  XM  +  XD
In this notation,  positive values of XD  are treated as payments made by DOWN, positive values
of XM  as payments made by MID, and positive values of xf, as payments received by UP.page  16
4.2 An Example  Three-State  I-Geography  Problem  with  No Out-of-Basin  Sources
The determination  of the Contract Curve and the Bargaining Range for the problem
introduced  in section  4.1 is similar to the calculations  in section  3.2, and will not be given here
in detail. It can be shown,  for example,  that  when  all three states  are consuming  positive  amounts
of river water, then the amount received  by UP is
bDbMQ  - bDIn(aMlau)  bMln(aD/au)
qu  bD  b ,  bL?bM  bM  bD
Furthermore, the amounts to MID and DOWN  are symmetric:  they can be obtained from the
expression  for qu by applying  (once or twice)  the cyclic permutation  (U, M, D) - (M, D, U).
A complete  schedule  for the three states  is shown  in Figure 8.  For very low volumes, all
the water is consumed  by DOWN. As volume  increases,  the water  is shared between DOWN  and
MID.  At large volumes, all three states consume positive quantities of water.  Note that the line
dividing the shares of DOWN and MID has a sharp corner at Q =  ln(4/3) +  '/21n(7/3)  (0.711.
which is the threshold above which all three states consume water.
The complete compensation schedule for the three states is represented in Figure 9.  Of
the four lines,
a  the lowest (on the left) is the maximum amount that MID can be required to pay--note that
it equals zero at very low volumes, where MID receives no water;
*  the lowest (on the right) is the minimum amount that UP can receive, which equals the
minimum total payment of DOWN and MID;
*  the second highest is the maximum amount that DOWN can be required to pay; and
*  the highest is the maximum amount that UP can receive, which of course equals the total
of what  DOWN and MID can be required to pay.  Note that, at very low volumes, the
maximum paid by MID is zero, so the maximum amount that UP can receive equals the
maximum amount that DOWN can be required to pay.
In fact, the lowest three lines contain all of the information needed to construct the Bargaining
Zone for any value of Q.
Figure  10 illustrates the Bargaining Zones for three specific values of Q.  The shaded
triangles represent all feasible combinations of amounts paid by MID (vertical axis) and DOWN
(horizontal axis).  Note that the minimum to be received by UP determines the 450 line that forms
the lower left-hand boundary of each Bargaining Zone.  Note that xmD may be negative or zero
at Q = 0.25, which is within the interval where all of the water is consumed by DOWN.  In thispage 17
interval, DOWN pays a positive amount, UP receives a positive amount, and MID receives either
a positive amount or zero, depending on the specific bargaining outcome achieved.  For the other
values of Q illustrated, XMD may be positive, negative, or zero.
In summary, for Example 4 we have determined a complete schedule for consuming water,
and paying appropriate compensation, for each possible value of Q, the total volume of water
available.  Because this schedule is essentially the Contract Curve for the problem,  a Pareto-
efficient schedule of water allocation and payments is guaranteed.  As previously, the Contract
Curve determines water volumes precisely; it does not, in general, determine compensation levels
exactly, but rather establishes bounds that create a Bargaining Zone.  A similar calculation could
be carried  out for more complex models, in which one or more of the states has an option to
purchase out-of-basin water,  similar to Example 3.
5. The Consequences of Variations in Flow Volume
A simplified  model of stochastic  flow will now be used to assess the affects on welfare of
the allocation scheme proposed in the preceding sections.  The object is to gain some insight into
how much benefit can be achieved, first, by imposing a fixed allocation in conditions of annually
varying flow, and,  second, by adjusting each year's  allocation so that it is optimal with respect
to that year's  flow volume.
All calculations will be carried out for Example 1 of Section 3.2.  The measure of benefit
used will be total regional welfare.  In Example 1, if total flow volume is Q and the withdrawal-
payment schedule is (q, x),  then the total welfare of states UP and DOWN is
W(q)  - Wu(q,x)  +  WD(q,x)  =  20  - 12e ql2  - 8  q
Note that total welfare depends only the allocation amounts q (to UP) and Q - q (to DOWN), and
not  on  x,  the  payment  level.  This  is
convenient,  because  the  allocations  are
precisely  determined  under  this  system,  UP's  Withdrawal  q lip
whereas  all that is known about x  is that  it  0.10
must lie somewhere in the bargaining range.
The 25-50-25 stochastic flow model is
a very stylized normal distribution, shown in  0.05
the  probability  histogram  below  left.  This
model assumes that, in any year, flow volume
equals its long-term average (denoted N, for  /
Normal)  with  probability  0.50;  volume  is  0.40
25 %  below  its  long-term  average  with  Flow  Volume  Qpage  18
probability 0.25,  and 25% above its  long-term
average  with  the  complementary  probability,
0.25.  All years are assumed independent.
0.50  - To model high water demand conditions,
assume that N =  0.36.  The relevant region of
UP's  optimal consumption function is shown in
0.25  - the  figure  above  right.  To  summarize,  this
function  combined with the 25-50-25 flow model
produces  flow  volume  Q =  0.36  and  optimal
l  1 l  allocation  q,  =0.048  with probability  1/2, Q =
75%  N  125%  0.27  and qo  0 with probability  ¼4,  and  Q =
0.45 and q 0 = 0.108 with probability 1/4.  In these
three  cases,  total  welfare  W(Q) equals  2.429,
1.893, and 2.948,  respectively; expected total welfare is 2.425.
In contrast, suppose that UP's withdrawal level, qui, is fixed at 0.048  regardless of total
flow volume, Q.  Note that 0.048 is in fact the optimal value of qu 1 under normal flow conditions,
i.e. when Q = 0.36;  this withdrawal level will be suboptimal whenever flow is abnormally low
or  high,  which occurs half the time in the 25-50-25 model.  The above formula for  W(Q) still
applies however,  and shows that total welfare is 2.429,  1.877, and 2.933,  respectively,  in the
three cases.  Expected total welfare is 2.417.  Thus this calculation suggests that the capacity to
adjust current withdrawal rates to flow has a marginal effect,  increasing welfare by only 0.3%.
Some idea of the extent of this benefit is shown by Figure 11, which shows the effects of
variable withdrawal, and various fixed withdrawal rates, on total welfare.  Note that, among fixed
rates, the one which maximizes total welfare is QUP  = 0.048,  the optimal rate for normal flow.
It is clear  that,  if a fixed withdrawal rate is used, then choosing the optimal rate can increase
expected welfare by 10% - 20%.
There are several reasons to believe that the above calculation understates the benefits of
a variable withdrawal schedule on welfare.  First, the 25-50-25 flow model implies that half the
time, flow is precisely normal, in which case the best fixed rate coincides with the variable rate.
A more realistic model would show that the variable rate produces some benefits, even when flow
is close  to normal.  More important, the 25-50-25 model does not allow for low-probability
extreme events, when the costs of a far-from-optimal fixed rate would be expected to be greatest.
Finally, the high-water-demand scenario represented by the assumption of N = 0.36 also biases
the calculation, since in the 75%-of-Normal  event, the optimal variable rate (q, =  0) is not as far
from the best fixed rate (0.048) as it would be if flow conditions were such that both states were
optimally allocated positive water volumes.
To test this latter assertion, the calculation  was repeated for N = 6.0 in the 25-50-25 flow
model.  Expected total welfare then equals 16.714 using the best fixed schedule, and  17.148 usingpage 19
the  variable  schedule.  Thus  the  variable  schedule  makes  a  somewhat  more  significant
improvement of about 2.6%.  Again, the best fixed schedule represents an improvement of about
10% - 20% over suboptimal schedules.
It is conjectured that in more realistic flow models the variable allocation system will result
in improvements on the order of 10% relative to the best fixed allocation.  This conjecture will
be tested as part of a future project.
6. Conclusions
The objective of this paper has been to indicate how to assess whether stable water-sharing
agreements  in international river basins are possible,  and to identify and describe,  insofar as
possible., any stable agreements that do exist.  A method for determining stable allocations was
developed  and applied to  some simple two- and three-country  models.  For  stability, and to
maximize welfare over the long term, this method depends on the operation of new systems that
will  make current  flow data available to  each riparian,  permitting  each to  learn  the others'
withdrawal  rates.  These systems will also provide accurate annual flow volume predictions,
making feasible annual adjustments in allocations (and payments).  Using some simple examples,
it  was  shown  that  an adjustable allocation  scheme that reflects  total flow volume  results  in
improved total welfare,  relative to the best fixed scheme.
But there are other reasons, beyond this increase in total welfare,  for recommending a
system that adjusts the allocation according to  the total annual flow volume.  The best fixed
allocation may be difficult to determine, not just because of the stochastic nature of the flow, but
because long term trends may be changing the flow distribution. As well, demands for water may
change with time, and the particular allocation that maximizes  welfare may depend on the location
and shape of the demand curves.  And, as noted in the Introduction, a more fundamental problem
is that an allocation system that is far out of line relative to the supply of and demands for water
may be challenged by one or more riparians, leading to regional tensions and, possibly, war.
Future research will include the application  of these ideas to an existing international river
basin, using more realistic models of the flow and the riparians'  water demands.  It is hoped that
the these methods will permit full utilization of current flow level data, which is about to become
available.  This  important information, if efficiently utilized, may be crucial to the social and
economic development of many countries around the world.page  20
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